Ethnic or multi-ethnic parties? : Party competition and legislative recruitment in Moldova by Protsyk, Oleh & Osoian, Ion
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethnic or multi-ethnic parties? Party competition and 
legislative recruitment in Moldova  
 
 
Oleh Protsyk and Ion Osoian 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECMI Working Paper #47 
March 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MINORITY ISSUES (ECMI) 
Schiffbruecke 12 (Kompagnietor) D-24939 Flensburg 
 +49-(0)461-14 14 9-0   fax +49-(0)461-14 14 9-19 
e-mail: info@ecmi.de   Internet: http://www.ecmi.de 
 2 
ECMI Working Paper #47 
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) 
Director Tove H. Malloy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright 2010 by the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) 
Published in March 2010 by the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) 
 3 
 
The European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) is a 
nonpartisan institution founded in 1996 by the Governments of 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and the German State of Schleswig-Holstein. ECMI was 
established in Flensburg, at the heart of the Danish-German 
border region, in order to draw from the encouraging example of 
peaceful coexistence between minorities and majorities achieved 
here. ECMI‟s aim is to promote interdisciplinary research on 
issues related to minorities and majorities in a European 
perspective and to contribute to the improvement of interethnic 
relations in those parts of Western and Eastern Europe where 
ethnopolitical tension and conflict prevail. 
 
ECMI Working Papers are written either by the staff of ECMI or 
by outside authors commissioned by the Centre. As ECMI does 
not propagate opinions of its own, the views expressed in any of 
its publications are the sole responsibility of the author 
concerned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECMI Working Paper #47 
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) 
 
 4 
       
 
Securing adequate representation of minorities in institutions of the state is commonly 
described in the literature as an important mechanism for addressing issues of ethnic tensions 
in culturally diverse societies1. A proportional electoral system is generally perceived as more 
friendly for representation of minority interests than a majoritarian single member district 
system2. The introduction of the former system in a number of post-communist countries 
encouraged institutionalization of ethnic minority parties. These parties became a permanent 
part of the political landscape in South Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria and 
Romania3.   
Moldova, which is also often classified as belonging to the same geographic region, 
did not witness the emergence of electorally successful minority parties. This is despite the 
fact that proportional representation (PR) rules were introduced from the very start of the 
post-independence transition and competitive politics evolved under conditions of high levels 
of ethnic mobilization. Ethnic parties did not succeed even though political competition in 
Moldova was relatively unconstrained by authoritarian practices employed throughout the rest 
of the former Soviet Union. In terms of one frequently cited indicator, the Freedom House 
index of democratic freedoms, Moldova performed better during most of the post-communist 
period than any other post-Soviet successor state with the exception of the Baltic republics. 4 
This paper attributes the lack of minority party institutionalization in the Moldovan 
case to the success of political entrepreneurs engaged in constructing political organizations 
capable of winning multi-ethnic support. These entrepreneurs have drawn on the resources 
and legacies of the Soviet period in order to compete successfully for societal support in a 
new democratic environment and in a new country where approximately 24% of the citizens 
found themselves belonging to an ethnic minority population. In addition to having invested 
in  the development of programmatic profiles attractive to multi-ethnic constituencies, they 
effectively implemented recruitment policies intended to build genuinely multi-ethnic 
political organizations.  The paper examines a key element of these policies – legislative 
recruitment.  As has been argued in the literature, legislative recruitment is an important 
                                                 
1
 P. Norris, "Ballots Not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems, and 
Democratization", in A. Reynolds (ed.) The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict  
Management and Democracy  (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 2002), 206-248. 
2
 A. Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies", 15 Journal of Democracy (2004), 96-109. 
3
 J.K. Birner, Ethnicity and electoral politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007 ; W. Crowther, 
"Romania", in  S. Berglund, J. Ekman and F.H. Aarebrot (eds.) Handbook of Political Change in  Eastern Europe 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2004).  
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aspect of the political process which affects both popular perceptions of the legitimacy of the 
political system and substantive policy outcomes generated by the political process5.  
The paper first discusses the country‟s unexpected choice of the PR electoral system at 
the start of the transition and the effects that this choice had on the strategies of political 
parties and on electoral outcomes. It then turns to examining the patterns of legislative 
recruitment and to comparing the ethnic profile of parliamentary deputies elected through the 
lists of political parties belonging to the different ideological families. The disputed nature of 
the ethnic affiliation of deputies belonging to a titular group, which is an interesting 
phenomenon specific to the Moldovan case, is addressed next. The effects that recruitment 
strategies of electorally successful parties had on the overall level of minority representation 
in the national parliament are discussed in the final section of the paper.  
  
   
Electoral system and party building in Moldova 
Moldova‟s choice of electoral system was unusual in the post-Soviet context. This 
country case illustrates how a specific political context rather than interests and preferences of 
politicians in charge of drafting electoral laws can shape the design of electoral institutions6. 
The country‟s first fully free and competitive parliamentary elections, which were held in 
1994, used the PR formula for seat allocation7. The country was designated into a single 
electoral district in which parties competed on the basis of closed lists and were required to 
cross the 4% electoral threshold in order to gain parliamentary representation. All other 
Western Commonwealth of Independent states (CIS) countries, as well as all other post-
Soviet states excluding Estonia and Latvia, opted for a mixed-member or single-member 
district (SMD) system. Political forces that dominated the transition in post-Soviet republics 
preferred the latter types of electoral system primarily due to the fact that this system builds 
                                                                                                                                                        
4
 The Freedom House index registered a decline in Moldova's democratic standards since 2005. See: Moldova, 
available at: http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/nit2009/moldova.pdf , last accessed 30 June 2009. 
5
 P. Norris, Passages to Power: legislative recruitment in advanced democracies  (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge (1997) ; H. Best and M. Cotta, Parliamentary representatives in Europe, 1848-2000: legislative 
recruitment and careers in eleven European countries (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2000); 
W. Crowther and I. Matonyte, "Parliamentary elites as a democratic thermometer: Estonia, Lithuania and 
Moldova compared", 40 Comparative Political Studies  (2007), 281-299. 
6
 S. Birch, F. Millard, M. Popescu, K. Williams, Embodying democracy: electoral system design in post-
Communist Europe (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2002) ; O. Shvetsova, "Endogenous Selection of 
Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects", 14 Constitutional Political Economy  (2003), 191-212. 
7
 W. Crowther and S.D. Roper, "A Comparative Analysis of Institutional Development in the Romanian and 
Moldovan Legislatures", in D.M. Olson and P. Norton (eds.), The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern  
Europe (Frank Cass, London, 1996), 133-160; W. Crowther, "The Politics of Democratization in Post-
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on the personalistic ties and networks which characterized much of later Soviet politics. At 
the same time, parties were at a very early stage of development and societal support for 
introducing a PR electoral system which would have favored parties was rather weak. 
These general circumstances of the post-Soviet transition were also applicable to 
Moldova. The record of this early period reveals heated debates about various draft laws 
favoring a mixed-member or PR electoral system. The reason why PR was chosen was due to 
the political need to have an electoral formula that could give at least a possible option of 
electoral participation for citizens in the secessionist region of Transnistria. This consideration 
was connected to the most salient issue on the political agenda of that period, the secessionist 
conflict in Transnistria. The authorities of this breakaway region had almost complete de facto 
control of the area by the end of 1992 and would have been able to prevent parliamentary 
elections based on an SMD system. Introducing a PR system with a single national district 
was thus seen by the Moldovan politicians as a way of avoiding an explicit  acknowledgement 
of the loss of Moldova‟s sovereignty over a part of the country‟s territory. PR was the 
electoral system which would allow citizens from the Transnistria region to participate in 
elections by casting their votes in locations controlled by the central government. Although 
opinion polls show that a large proportion of citizens (70-80%) were in favor of electing 
deputies in single-member districts, various attempts to conduct a referendum or to pass a law 
on the introduction of a SMD or mixed-member system have not been successful. 
The secessionist conflict shaped deliberations about the electoral law in another 
important way. By the time the drafts of the electoral law were debated in the Moldovan 
parliament in 1993 a large number of Transnistrian deputies had left the parliament. The 
preferences of a majority in this group, which included a large number of state enterprise 
directors, were in line with those law drafters who favored a personalistic and candidate 
centered electoral system. The passage of the PR version of the electoral law was therefore 
facilitated by the departure of these members of parliament.  
The main provisions of the electoral law remained the same throughout the post-
communist period.8 The electoral threshold requirements, however, saw a number of 
important modifications. The electoral threshold for individuals parties was raised to 6 % in 
                                                                                                                                                        
Communist Moldova", in K. Dawisha and B. Parrott (eds.), Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), 282-330. 
8 Independent candidates are also allowed to run in the elections but their position is clearly disadvantaged.  
They face stricter registration requirements and need to gain  3% of the national vote to enter the parliament. See 
O. Protsyk and I. Osoian, "Moldova: Party Institutionalization in a Resource-Scarce Environment", in S.D. 
Roper and J. Ikstens (eds.) Public Finance and Post-Communist Party Development (Ashgate, London, 2008), 
95-112. 
 7 
the 2001 and 2005 parliamentary elections  and the higher levels of electoral threshold for 
electoral blocs were also introduced in the  2005 elections (9% for blocks consisting of two 
parties and 12% for blocks of more than two parties).  
In addition to electoral laws, certain provisions of the law on political parties also 
favored national-wide political parties. Thus, since 1998, a party could only be registered with 
the Ministry of Justice if it had at least 5000 members having residence in at least a half of 
intermediate-level administrative-territorial units,9 but not less than 150 in each of the 
mentioned territorial units. In terms of minority politics, this provision has had a major effect 
only on the functioning of the ethnic Gagauz parties formed in the autonomous territorial unit 
Gagauzia. 
Overall, the passage of the first electoral law and the use of the same basic principles 
in the subsequent pieces of legislation were of critical importance for the institutionalization 
of the party system. Electoral system rules, which were combined with a constitutionally 
weak presidency and party participation in the cabinet formation process, provided incentives 
for parties to start investing in developing policy-making capacities and in constructing 
coherent public images. These rules also led to the dominance of the party rather than 
candidate-oriented campaigns throughout Moldova‟s entire post-communist period. 
The electoral results produced by the Moldovan party system operating under these 
institutional rules are summarized in Table 1: 
 
Table 1.  Moldovan Parliamentary Election Results, 1994-2005 
Year 1994 1998 2001 2005 
Electoral threshold, % 4% 4% 6% 
6%=1, 9%=2, 
12%>2 parties 
Electoral contestants V% S% V% S% V% S% V% S% 
Democratic Convention Electoral Bloc  - - 19.42 25.7  - - - - 
For a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova Electoral Bloc  - - 18.16 23.8 - -  - - 
(Democratic) Agrarian Party  43.18 53.9 3.63 0  1.16 0 - - 
  Alliance of the Popular Christian Democratic Front   7.53 8.65 - - -  - - - 
Christian Democratic Peoples‟ Front/Party 1  - - - - 8.24 10.9 9.07 10.89 
Democratic Party of Moldova2  - - - - 5.02 0 - - 
Electoral Bloc Braghis Alliance  - - - - 13.36 18.8 - - 
Electoral Bloc Moldova Democrata - - - - -  - 28.53 33.66 
Electoral Bloc Patria-Rodina - - - - -  - 4.97 0 
Party for Renaissance and Conciliation of Moldova  - - - - 5.79 0 - - 
Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova  - - 30.01 39.6 50.07 70.3 45.98 55.45 
Party of Democratic Forces - - 8.84 10.9 - - -  - 
Peasants and Intellectuals Bloc 9.21 10.6 - - -  - -  - 
Socialist Party and Unitate-Edinstvo Movement Bloc 22 26.9 - - -  - -  - 
                                                 
9
 Moldova‟s administrative  organisation currently includes  32 districts (raioane), 3 municipalities (Chişinău, 
Bălţi, and Bender/Tighina), one autonomous territorial unit (Gagauzia), and one territorial unit (Transnistria) -the 
status of the latter not being defined yet. 
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Others (parties, blocs and independent candidates) 18.1 0 19.9 0 16.34 0 11.5 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Note: The electoral contestants who obtained more than four percent in at least one election are only listed.  
1
 In 1994 in a coalition named Alliance of the Popular Christian Democratic Front and in 1998 in the Democratic 
Convention Electoral Bloc.  
2
 In 1998 in a coalition named For a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova Electoral Bloc and in 2005 in the 
Electoral Bloc Moldova Democrata. 
Source: data from www.e-democracy.md (accessed: 04.04.2007) 
 
 
 
As Table 1 indicates, only four electoral contestants were able to enter the parliament 
in the first two rounds of electoral competition. The change in the electoral threshold prior to 
the 2001 elections had the effect of further decreasing the number of successful electoral 
contestants to three in each of the subsequent rounds of elections. The 2001 rise of the 
electoral threshold was a product of the legislators‟ intention to encourage party system 
consolidation.  Prior to 2001 the identity of parties and party blocs was very unstable, 
especially in the early period of the post-communist transition. The majority of parties 
represented through electoral blocs in the first parliament elected in 1994 chose different 
alliances or even changed party labels to participate in subsequent parliamentary elections. 
The creation of new parties and coalitions was the politicians‟ response to particularly acute 
failures in governance during the 1994-2001 period.  
The party system became somewhat more stable after the 2001 parliamentary 
elections. The Communist Party (PCRM) has dominated the political process in the country 
since its parliamentary victory in the 2001 elections10. As the table indicates, the party had 
already become the largest parliamentary faction after the 1998 elections.  These were the first 
elections the party contested after being re-established following the lifting of the ban on the 
activities of the communist party. The communist party‟s 2001 victory was magnified by the 
inability of several parties to clear a newly established 6% threshold.  This enabled the PCRM 
to control the constitutional majority of parliamentary seats between 2001 and 2005. The 
party managed to retain power by winning the 2005 parliamentary elections, although with a 
significantly smaller margin than in 2001.  
                                                 
10
 S.D. Roper, "From semi-presidentialism to parliamentarianism: Regime change and presidential power in  
Moldova", 60 Europe-Asia Studies (2008), 113-126; L. March, "From Moldovanism to Europeanization? 
Moldova‟s Communists and Nation-building", 35 Nationalities Papers (2007) ; L. March and G.P. Herd, 
"Moldova Between Europe and Russia: Inoculating against the Colored Contagion?", 22 Post-Soviet Affairs, 
349-379. 
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Neither of the political parties that individually or as a part of an electoral bloc entered 
the Moldovan parliament throughout the analyzed period could be described as an ethnic 
minority party.  The operational definition employed in this paper categorizes a political 
organization as an ethnic minority party when the organization competes primarily on ethnic 
minority issues,  relies electorally exclusively on the ethnic minority vote, and is sustained 
organizationally by the ethnic minority membership. Ethnic minority parties are not listed in 
Table 1, which summarizes the results for electoral winners only.  Ethnic minority parties, 
however, can be found in the Moldovan case among the electoral losers.  
Organizations that meet the operational definition of an ethnic minority party 
proposed here have been formed and have competed in a number of parliamentary elections in 
Moldova. For example, the Socio-Political Movement “Ravnopravie” (SPMR), which is 
translated as “equal rights” movement, contested both the 2001 and 2005 parliamentary 
elections.  The organization campaigned explicitly on the political agenda that prioritized the 
protection of ethnic minority rights. The distinct feature of its campaign strategies was an 
attempt to appeal to voters across minority groups. The choice of this form of ethnic appeal 
was based on calculations rooted in the Soviet experience of inter-ethnic coexistence in 
Moldova. Linguistic Russification of main minority groups in Moldova during the Soviet 
period made appeals, first of all, for the introduction of Russian as a second state language, an 
attractive strategy for ethnic entrepreneurs seeking to mobilize not only ethnic Russians but 
also other minority groups.  
Another notable example is that of the ethnic Gagauz parties that have existed in 
Gagauzia regions before 1998, such as Popular Party “Vatan” and Gagauz People‟s Party. 
The parties had their roots in popular movements in the region which fought for the rights of 
the Gagauzian minority in the early 1990s and greatly contributed to the establishment of the 
autonomous territorial unit Gagauzia. Despite all this, in the 1995 elections of the Gagauz 
autonomy‟s legislature (People‟s Assembly) Gagauz voters preferred candidates nominated 
by national parties, workers‟ collectives, and independent candidates rather than regional 
parties‟ candidates.11     
                                                 
11
 I. Botan,  "Elections in Gagauzia - a new beginning or déjà vu?", 4 Democracy and governing in Moldova 
[ADEPT] (2006), December 30. 
Available at: http://www.e-democracy.md/en/comments/200612302/index.shtml 
Accessed 4 August 2009 ; The two Gagauz parties secured only six seats out of 34, while the Party of 
Communists of the Republic of Moldova won eight seats, the Democratic Agrarian Party – four seats, worker‟s 
collectives – 11 seats and independent candidates – 5 seats. 
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The inability of the Socio-Political Movement “Ravnopravie” to gain sufficient 
electoral support to enter the parliament, as well as failures of other political organizations  to 
mobilize minority voters on purely ethnic appeals in the  earlier rounds of parliamentary and 
autonomy elections, is a product of the success that some mainstream parties had in attracting 
and sustaining minority support. This success is partly attributed to the appropriation by these 
parties of political slogans articulated by ethnic minority entrepreneurs.  It is also a result of 
the parties‟ recruitment policies. Some of the mainstream political parties provided ample 
opportunities for politically active members of minority groups to rise through the  party 
ranks to positions of prestige and power in institutions of the state, thus denying  ethnic 
entrepreneurs the ability to claim exclusive rights to minority group representation.12  
 
Ethnic dimension of legislative recruitment 
 The adoption of the closed list PR system provided the leadership of political parties 
with a high degree of control over the formation of electoral lists. The expectation that such 
rules would strengthen the role of the party leadership vis-à-vis such  bodies as the general 
party conference or local party organizations is indirectly corroborated by the results of a 
recent survey of experts on the Moldovan party system.  Expert survey results indicate that 
party leadership plays a much more important role than other party organs in all key aspects 
of parties‟ internal decision making processes13. Selecting party candidates for legislative 
office is one of such key decision-making areas. Parliamentary posts are positions of high 
political power and prestige, and are few in number.  The number of parliamentary seats 
available for any electorally successful party is always much smaller than the number of 
loyalists the party would like to reward or the number of prominent individuals whose support 
the party would like to ensure through granting them a secure position on the party‟s electoral 
list. Pre-election public opinion polls provide party leadership with quite accurate estimates 
on the number of seats the party can expect to win. The poll results thus set a limit on what 
could be considered the winning portion of the electoral list of any given party. By allocating 
                                                 
12
 For example, Nicolai Oleinic, chairman of the ethnic  Ukranian association, had been an MP on the communist 
party‟s  list both in the 1994 and 2005 parliaments. Dmitrii Croitor, a prominent Gagauz  leader, was an MP in 
the 1998 term for the « For a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova » Electoral Bloc and  was  later elected as 
Bashkan (Governor) of Gagauzia.  Another Gagauz leader Gheorghe Tabunscic, was a communist party  MP in 
the 2001 term. He also served in 1995-1999 and in 2002-2006 as Bashkan (Governor) of Gagauzia.  
13
 O. Protsyk, I. Bucataru, and A. Volentir, Partiinaia konkurentsia v Moldove: ideologiia, organizatsiia, i. 
podkhody k razresheniiu etno-territorialnykh konfliktov (Universitatea de Stat din Moldova [USM], Chisinau, 
2008). 
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positions on electoral lists to individuals, the party leadership effectively decides which of the 
available party candidates will become parliamentary deputies. 
The composition of the parliamentary faction of political parties thus reflects the party 
leadership‟s prior decisions on which individual politicians should represent the party in the 
parliament. These decisions are a product of calculations based on numerous factors. 
Examining the profile of parliamentary deputies provides us with some insight into what 
factors shape these calculations. Given our interest in parties‟ strategies with regard to 
winning the support of ethnic minority groups, ethnic affiliation of individual deputies is one 
feature of deputies‟ profile that is examined in detail here. 
Despite the fact that considerable difficulties are involved in classifying the 
ideological orientation of many political parties that emerged in the post-communist space, 
one influential recent study highlights similarities in the ideological profiles of these parties to 
the profiles of traditional party families found in Western Europe14. Following this logic, 
Table 2 below classifies all Moldovan parties that had parliamentary representation in one of 
the five traditional party families. The table also lists the total number of deputies that served 
in parliament on behalf of the parties belonging to each individual party family and provides 
details on the distribution of deputies‟ ethnic identification. 
 
Table 2. Ethnic Affiliation of Moldovan MPs, by Party Family (1994-2009) 
 Communist 
Social 
Democrats Centre 
Christian 
Democrats Centre Right Total 
Moldovan/Romanian  61.65% 66.67% 78.75% 100% 100% 74.18% 
 (125) (63) (63) (36) (77) (364) 
       
Ukrainian 13.59% 8.69% 3.75% 0% 0% 8.2% 
 (29) (8) (3) (0) (0) (40) 
       
Russian 10.68% 15.21% 5% 0% 0% 8.2% 
 (23) (14) (4) (0) (0) (41) 
       
Gagauz 8.25% 4.35% 3.75% 0% 0% 4.92% 
 (17) (4) (3) (0) (0) (24) 
       
Other 3.4% 1.09% 5% 0% 0% 2.46% 
 (7) (1) (4) (0) (0) (12) 
       
No data 2.43% 1.09% 3.75% 0% 0% 2.05% 
 (5) (1) (3) (0) (0) (9) 
       
                                                 
14
 M. Gallagher, M. Laver and P. Mair, Representative Government in Modern Europe, 4
th
 ed. (McGraw-Hill, 
Boston, 2006). 
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Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 (206) (91) (80) (36) (77) (490) 
Legend: Communists: Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova; Social Democrats: Socialist Party and 
Unitate-Edinstvo Movement Bloc, Socialist Party of Moldova, Labour Union, "Furnica" Party of Social Democracy , 
"Speranta-Nadejda" Professionals' Movement; Centre: Democratic Agrarian Party, For a Democratic and Prosperous 
Moldova Movement, Democratic Party of Moldova, Centrist Union of Moldova, Civic Party of Moldova, Popular 
Democratic Party of Moldova, "Forta Noua" Socio-political Movement; Christian Democrats: Christian Democratic 
Peoples‟ Front/Party , Democratic Christian Party , Women's Christian-Democratic League of Moldova, Christian-
Democratic Peasants' Party ;  Centre-Right: National Liberal Party, Intellectuals Congress, Alliance of the Free Peasants, 
Party of Democratic Forces, Party of Rebirth and Reconciliation of Moldova, Our Moldova Alliance, Social-Liberal Party 
Note: the last column data includes several observations with missing info on party family  
Source: author’s calculations 
 
One of the most visible characteristics of Table 2 is that the share of minority deputies 
that served in parliament on the tickets of parties belonging to different party families varies 
significantly. As one moves from the left to the right of the table, the share of minority 
deputies drops from more than 35 % to 0%. The communist party family includes only one 
party in the Moldova case, PCRM. As discussed above, the party controlled the largest share 
of seats in the last three consecutive parliamentary terms. As the table data reveals, more than 
35% of deputies that served on the party‟s behalf in the parliament came from ethnic minority 
groups. The share of minority deputies drops to about 30 % for the parties that were classified 
as social democratic and to about 20% for the parties indentified as agrarian or center parties. 
Minorities were not represented at all in parliamentary groups formed by the parties of 
Christian democratic orientation or other types of center-right parties.    
This pattern indicates that it is the parties of the left who recruit the members of 
minority communities. These recruitment practices in turn contribute to the continuation of 
minority support for the left parties and to these parties‟ persistent dominance on the national 
scene. The parties of the Moldovan left varied in the degree of their programmatic support to 
the political agenda articulated by minority activists. Neither of the leftist parties represented 
in parliament, however, have made the minority-related issues a central focus of their 
electoral campaigns. In other words, the leftist parties have not attempted to turn into ethnic 
minority parties. They have not ceased their efforts to highlight the traditional concerns of the 
left such as social justice, redistribution, and welfarism. Left appeals and an accommodative 
stance on minority issues were combined by these parties with inclusive recruitment policies. 
This combination has proved to be a winning electoral formula for the most of the post-
communist period.15 
                                                 
15
 On programmatic aspects of party competition in Moldova see (O. Protsyk et al., Partiinaia konkurentsia v. 
Moldove  (2008); see also L. March, "From Moldovanism to Europeanization? Moldova's Communists and 
Nation-building", 35 Nationalities Papers (2007), 601-625. 
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The dominance of left parties is reflected in absolute number of deputies that entered 
the parliament on the ticket of left parties. As the table indicates 298 out of 488 deputies that 
served in the Moldovan parliament since 1994 belong either to communist party or to the 
parties of social-democratic orientation. The presence of significant number of minority 
deputies in the legislature across the individual parliamentary terms is largely due to the 
significant presence of left-wing parties in each of the terms. 
Table 3 below provides details on the share of titular group and minorities across 
individual parliamentary terms. For post-independence terms, the titular share varied between 
63.71% and 84.62% of legislative seats. The lowest share of titular group deputies was 
recorded for the 2001-2005 parliamentary term, which is the period when the communist 
party controlled the largest majority in parliament. The size of this majority has been, to a 
considerable extent, a product of party‟s ability to defeat its various competitors for ethnic 
minority vote. 
 
Table 3. Distribution of MPs’ Ethnic Affiliation Across Parliamentary Terms  
 1990-94 1994-98 1998-01 2001-05 2005-09 Total 
Moldovan/Romanian  71.24% 70% 84.62% 63.71% 79.49% 72.9% 
 (270) (91) (99) (79) (92) (631) 
       
Ukrainian 8.71% 5.38% 5.13% 17.74% 4.27% 8.42% 
 (33) (7) (6) (22) (6) (74) 
       
Russian 16.62% 12.31% 3.42% 8.87% 7.69% 11.88% 
 (63) (16) (4) (11) (10) (104) 
       
Gagauz 2.64% 4.62% 5.13% 7.26% 2.56% 3.92% 
 (10) (6) (6) (9) (3) (34) 
       
Other 0.26% 3.85% 1.71% 2.42% 1.71% 1.5% 
 (1) (5) (2) (3) (2) (13) 
       
No  data 0.53% 3.85% 0% 0% 4.27% 1.38% 
 (2) (5) (0) (0) (5) (12) 
       
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 (379) (130) (117) (124) (118) (868) 
Note: the count of deputies includes both term starters and late comers 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
 
Besides listing data for the all post-independence terms, the table also gives details for 
the last legislature from the communist period. That legislature was dominated by the old 
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Communist Party of the Moldovan SSR, which had been a highly multi-ethnic organization 
on its own terms. The vast majority of minority deputies that served in the 1990-94 parliament 
came from the ranks of the Communist Party. The party was banned following the August 
1991 coup attempt in Moscow and was unable to contest the 1994 parliamentary elections. 
Many of the Communist Party functionaries then took a part in creating the Socialist Party 
and Unitate-Edinstvo Movement.  Two organizations formed a bloc which was successful in 
contesting the 1994 elections.  Approximately 60% of deputies that the bloc put in the 
parliament in 1994 came from ethnic minority groups, which accounts for the highest share of 
minority deputies for any party or alliance that successfully contested parliamentary elections 
in Moldova. Minority problems constituted one of the central campaign issues for the bloc. 
Focus on minority issues, however, did not help either of organizations to enter the 
1998 parliament. The votes they expected to win went largely to a newly established 
Communist Party, PCRM. The party, formally, was not a successor to the Communist Party 
of MSSR. In terms of personnel, structures, and policies the newly established PCRM 
nevertheless showed a high degree of continuity with the old party. In its electoral campaigns 
PCRM explicitly linked itself to the predecessor and used cultural capital and symbolic 
recourses provided by the communist past. 
Inclusive recruitment was a central part of the PCRM‟s overall electoral strategy. The 
PCRM‟s electoral list for the 2001 parliamentary elections included, for example, 9 ethnic 
Gagauz, all of whom eventually served as MPs in the course of the 2001-05 parliamentary 
term. These were individuals with a strong reputation and standing in the minority 
community. Among others, former governor of Gagauzia Gheorghe Tabunscic was in this 
group. The PCRM‟s aggressive recruitment drive became one of the factors that led the 
Gagauz community, which is the only minority group that was granted a territorial autonomy  
status in the early 1990s, to vote overwhelmingly for the PCRM in 2001. 80.6% of votes in 
the Gagauz autonomy in 2001 was cast for the communists. This was the highest result the 
party received across the country.  The average share of minority deputies that served on the 
Communist Party‟s behalf in the different parliaments was about 35 %. 
 
Titular group representation 
The Moldovan case provides a very interesting variation in terms of titular group 
representation. This representation reflects a disputed nature of titular group identity. 
Moldovanism and Romanianism are two competing visions of the ethnic identity of the 
majority group. They translate into two different types of ethnic majority nationalism, which 
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could be respectively termed as “state-seeking” and “unification” types of nationalism. Both 
are comprised of well elaborated sets of values and beliefs that serve as a basis for political 
mobilization and provide coherence for policy agendas and political goals articulated in the 
public domain. 
For Moldovanists, the essential unifying features of their identity complex are history, 
culture, religion, and language, all of which are claimed as being distinct and different from 
Romanian. The advocates of Romanianism question the distinctiveness of these 
characteristics and see them, at most, as regional variations of a common Romanian history 
and pan-Romanian culture. Thus Moldovan and Romanian identities are seen by 
Romanianists  as complimentary, while for Moldovanists they are competitive.  Debates over 
Moldovanism and Romanianism provided the strongest inspiration for political action in the 
early 1990s. The Romanianist orientation of key leaders in the Popular Front, a mass political 
movement that dominated political life in Moldova at the beginning of the 1990s, explains the 
political salience of a policy agenda associated with a Romanian identity complex. 
The rapid decline of the Popular Front‟s popularity and its organizational 
disintegration dramatically decreased the political clout of groups and organizations 
associated with Romanianism, but did not mean that political battles over the symbols 
associated with different identity complexes ceased. At the same time, Moldovanists, whose 
political victory over competitors from the ranks of the Popular Front was solidified by the 
results of the 1994 parliamentary elections, chose to focus on only some of the potential 
conflicts over identity-rooted policy issues with the proponents of Romanianism.  
The 1994 consultative referendum on independence was one of these battles. Initiated 
by the Moldovan president Snegur, who is often credited with providing programmatic 
coherence to Moldovanism in his  public speeches16, the referendum marked, at least 
temporarily, a closing of  the window of  opportunity for the active pursuit of  the unification 
agenda. The voters overwhelmingly rejected the unification option and supported 
independence. The referendum results, which were easily forecasted both by referendum 
supporters and opponents, had a demobilizing effect on the Romanianist camp and took the 
unification issue off the active political agenda. The ambiguities over the nature of ethnic 
identity, however, persist both on collective and individual levels. President Snegur, whose 
position on the issue of identity subsequently shifted away from the strongly  pro-
Moldovanist pole due to the electoral maneuvering in the up-run to the  1996 presidential 
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elections, for example, is identified in a number of published  sources as „Moldovan 
(Romanian)‟. 
Identifying himself/herself exclusively as an ethnic Romanian became a political 
statement indicating the person‟s political orientation and support for unification. Table 4 
below provides details on the distribution of deputies in the titular group according to this 
criteria. 
 
Table 4. Ethnic Affiliation of Titular Group MPs in Moldova, by Party Family (1994-2009) 
 Communist 
Social 
Democrat Centre 
Christian 
Democrat 
Centre 
Right No data Total 
        
Moldovans 100% 100% 84.13% 25% 60.87% 66.67% 82.04% 
 (125) (64) (53) (9) (43) (2) (296) 
        
Romanians 0% 0% 15.87% 75% 39.13% 33.33% 17.96% 
 (0) (0) (10) (27) (27) (1) (65) 
        
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 (125) (64) (63) (36) (70) (3) (361) 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
 
None of the deputies elected on the ticket of the communist party or social democratic 
parties identified themselves as Romanian. More than 15 % of deputies from the titular group 
declared their ethnic affiliation as Romanian in case of centrist parties. The percentage of the 
Romanian further increases when one moves to the parties of the centre right. A total of 75% 
of Christian Democrats, which traditionally take the most pro-unionist stance, declared 
themselves Romanian. When comparing the left wing and the centre right it is obvious that 
there is more variation in terms of ethnic self-identification among deputies belonging to the 
titular group in the parties of the centre right than in the parties of the left. 
Overall, this data and the findings cited earlier in the paper suggest that ethnic 
divisions and ideological left-right divisions overlap in the Moldovan case. Parties on the left 
are strongly Moldovanist in their cultural orientation while parties on the right gravitate to the 
pan-Romanian ethnic identification.  Recruitment patterns reflect the more inclusive positions 
that the left parties take on minority issues. The attempts by the centre right to develop a more 
inclusive image by adopting programmatic statements committing the parties to the protection 
                                                                                                                                                        
16
 Stefan Ihrig, “Romanian vs. Moldovanism-National Identity Negotiated in History Teaching in Moldova”, 
paper delivered at the ASN-Convention, April 2005. 
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of minority rights have not been supported so far by these parties‟ efforts to put minorities in 
positions of power in their organizations. 
 
Proportionality of ethnic representation 
The continuing presence of a large number of ethnic minority deputies in the national 
parliament is a product of continuing dominance of the left wing parties on the political scene. 
These parties have been open to the idea of minority recruitment throughout the post-
communist period both because of interest in having minorities‟ electoral support and because 
of more inclusive programmatic positions on identity issues. As a result of these recruitment 
policies a large number of members of minority communities entered the parliament. In fact, 
the aggregate data indicates a substantial degree of minority overrepresentation in the 
Moldovan parliament in the post-communist period. 
Table 5 combines data on ethnic distribution of the population with the data on ethnic 
composition of the Moldovan parliament. It lists population and parliamentary shares of all 
minority groups represented in the parliament and provides frequency information on a 
number of deputies of  each ethnic background.   The last column gives scores for the 
proportionality of representation index, which is calculated by dividing an ethnic group‟s 
proportion in the parliament by its proportion in the population. This provides a single 
summary figure where 1.0 symbolizes “perfect” proportional representation, more than 1.0 
designates a degree of “over-representation” and less than 1.0 indicates “under-
representation”.  
 
Table 5.  Proportionality of Ethnic Representation in Moldovan Parliament 
5a. Moldovan Census 2004/ Parliamentary Data 1994-2009 
Group Percentage  Number  
N of       
MPs Parl Share 
Proportionality 
Index 
Moldovans 75.80% 2564565.66  296 60.86% 0.80 
Ukrainians 8.40% 284199.89  41 8.20% 0.98 
Russians 5.90% 199616.59  41 8.20% 1.39 
Gagauzian 4.40% 148866.61  24 4.92% 1.12 
Romanians 2.20% 74433.30  65 13.32% 6.05 
Bulgarians 1.90% 64283.31  7 1.43% 0.75 
Others 1% 33833.32  5 1.02% 1.02 
No answer/data 0.40% 13533.33  10 2.05%  
 
Total 100% 3383332.00  489 100%  
       
5b. Moldovan Census 1989/Parliamentary Data 1990-94  
 Percentage  Number  
N of 
MPs Parl Share 
Proportionality 
Index 
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Moldovans 64.40% 2790700.00  270 71.24% 1.11 
Ukrainians 13.80% 599700.00  33 8.71% 0.63 
Russians 12.90% 560400.00  63 16.62% 1.29 
Gagauzian 3.50% 152700.00  10 2.64% 0.75 
Bulgarians 2% 87700.00  1 0.26% 0.13 
Others 3.40% 65600.00     
No data    2 0.53%  
Total  100.00% 4256800.00  379 100%  
Source: Population data from the 2004 and 1989 Moldovan censuses; Legislative data is based on 
author’s calculations. 
 
The table lists separately data for the 1990 parliamentary term and for the rest of the 
parliamentary terms. This is due to the fact that the breakaway region of Transnistria has not 
been effectively part of Moldova since 1992, thus changing the composition of Moldova  
population quite substantially. The results for the 1990 term, which include the Transnistrian 
data and which are reported in Table 5b, indicate a degree of overrepresentation for ethnic 
Moldovans. This overrepresentation came at the expense of all minority groups, except ethnic 
Russians. The latter enjoyed a higher degree of overrepresentation than ethnic Moldovans. 
The results for the post-communist period are summarized in Table 5a. The table 
combines data on all deputies who entered Moldovan parliament during the 1994-2008 
period. As the table indicates, the fortunes of the titular group have been reversed when 
compared with the 1990 term: ethnic Moldovans became underrepresented in the parliament 
during the post-communist period. The titular group was underrepresented even when one 
combines those deputies who declared themselves Moldovans and those who self-identified 
as Romanian. The degree of under representation in this case, however, is only minor -the 
value of the proportionality index is .98. When the share of ethnic Romanian deputies is taken 
separately, as it is in Table 5, this ethnic group is highly overrepresented. Proportionally many 
more politicians claim to be ethnic Romanians than the census figures reveal to be the case in 
the population. The census figure of 2.2% Romanians is, however, highly disputed in 
Moldova by many politicians on the center right who claim that the communist government, 
which is the ardent promoter of Moldovanism, manipulated the figures and reduced very 
significantly the number of citizens declaring themselves Romanian and point to the fact that 
16.5% stated Romanian as their mother tongue. 
In terms of minority groups, the table indicates that the Russians, the dominant group 
in the USSR, continue to be significantly overrepresented in the Moldovan parliament. As a 
comparison of Tables 5a and 5b indicates, the level of overrepresentation for Russians is 
higher for the 1994-2008 period than for the 1990-94 period. The Gagauz also enjoyed a 
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decree of overrepresentation in the post-communist period, albeit of a smaller magnitude than 
the Russians. Ukrainians, which are the largest minority group in Moldova, were almost 
proportionally represented. Among demographically large minority groups the ethnic 
Bulgarians remain the only significantly underrepresented minority group in the post-
communist period.  
Overall, these results indicate that the Moldovan party system has proven to be 
sufficiently inclusive in terms of minority representation. This representation has been 
achieved through multiethnic parties formed mainly by the political left and, to a smaller 
extent, by the centrist forces.  Recruitment practices of these parties have helped to ensure that 
ethnic exclusion practices did not become a hallmark of Moldovan politics in what proved to 
be a very difficult and conflict-prone transition from communist rule.   
 
Conclusion 
The ways in which societies‟ ethnic diversity is represented in the political sphere is 
shaped by many factors. Whether minorities become integrated into mainstream parties  or 
establish electorally successful minority organizations might be affected by minority group 
characteristics, history of co-existence  with majority, the polity‟s levels of democracy,  and 
the nature  of electoral rules. The paper provided a case study of the Moldovan party system, 
which evolved in circumstances favorable to the emergence of viable minority parties. The 
large demographic size of minority groups, their political mobilization in the early stages of 
post-communist transition, democratic openness of Moldovan political system, and electoral 
rules favoring party development all pointed to possibilities of party system 
institutionalization along ethnic lines.  
 Yet the Moldovan party system has so far avoided formalizing  the existing ethnic 
divisions in the configuration of the party system. Minorities have become integrated in the 
political process in Moldova in ways that are different from, for example, Bulgaria and 
Romania, where electorally successful ethic minority parties became a permanent feature of  
the political process. The paper provided an account of how this outcome came about by 
examining the electoral strategies of politicians with stakes in the construction of multi-ethnic 
organizations. These politicians capitalized on Soviet legacies of multi-ethnic organizational 
life and on the positive historical experience of ethnic group co-existence in building their 
organizations and attracting a multi-ethnic following. Their programmatic appeals and, what 
this paper specifically focused on, their recruitment strategies enabled them to win the 
competition with  the emerging ethnic minority entrepreneurs for minority group support. 
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The emphasis that this paper put on the role of agency, however, should make one 
aware of the risks of accepting the current dominance of multi-ethnic organizations as a  
reliable predictor of the absence of electorally successful minority organizations in Moldova‟s 
future.  The dynamic nature of the political process in new democracies provides a number of 
reasons for being sceptical about the prospects of the party system „freezing‟ in polities such 
as the Moldovan one. The paper‟s emphasis highlights instead the importance of analyzing 
the interaction between majority and minority politicians and the value of examining their 
recruitment and programmatic strategies. Such analysis and examination enrich our 
understanding of supply side relations in minority politics. 
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